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ARGUMENT
I.

CRIMINAL RESTITUTION IS PROPER ONLY WHEN PECUNIARY
HARM IS SHOWN
The State rebuts Defendant's claim that the trial court erred in. ordering restitution

by claiming that Stewart "could have recovered damages in a civil action for conversion."
Appellee Br. at 10. Meanwhile the State ignores, however, the underlying fact that
criminal restitution, in this case, rests on whether any pecuniary (or economic) harm
resulted. Defendant reasserts that because the prosecution demonstrated no pecuniary
harm to Stewart the trial court erred in ordering restitution in the amount of $9,838 under
Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-102.
//
//

I

a. Conversion of Property Does not Entitle a Victim to Restitution
Without a Showing of Pecuniary (Economic) Harm
All restitution based on criminal activity is necessarily predicated on whether the
victim suffered pecuniary harm. "'Restitution' means full, partial, or nominal payment
for pecuniary damages to a victim...." Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-102(l 1) (emphasis
added). '"Pecuniary damages' means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not
yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities...." Utah Code Ann. §77-3 8a102(6) (emphasis added). Thus, any court-ordered restitution must be based on evidence
that the victim suffered economic injury that could have been recovered in a civil action.
Stewart suffered no such economic injury.
Here, the State does not, nor could it, dispute that Stewart, despite Defendant's
criminal activity, continued to receive his annual salary of $64,000 from Utah Valley
University. (R. 78:20). Stewart's economic injury, by statute, is the basis for restitution.
However, by his own admission Stewart testified that he suffered no adverse economic
impact. The State seems to ignore this fact in claiming that because Stewart "could have
recovered damages in a civil action" that the restitution is still justified. This argument
obviates the economic damage requirement. See, Appellee Br. at 10.
In support, the State cites Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT App 355, 78
P.3d 988. The State erroneously claims that just because Defendant interfered with
Stewart's "chattel" that he is entitled to recovery. Jones, however, supports Defendant's
assertion that an "economic" harm must have occurred.

2

In Jones, this Court dealt with whether the trial court in dismissing defendant's
claim, at summary judgment, that the city had interfered with his possessory rights to
seized weapons by destroying those weapons. Jones, 2003 UT App 355,fflf1-6. This
Court, in Jones, recited rudimentary grounds for damages based on the civil theory of
conversion and held that because the defendant did not properly state a claim for
conversion the trial court properly dismissed the claim. Jones, 2003 UT App 355,fflf1920. It appears that the State's argument hinges upon this court's recital of "conversion"
to establish that Stewart was entitled to $9,838 in restitution.
While Jones does affirm that a person who has immediate possessory rights to
property may be entitled to damages for conversion, the fact remains that damages must
still exist. Jones, 2003 UT 355, f 9; see also. Appellee Br. at 10. The real issue in Jones
was whether the complainant had possessory rights to weapons destroyed by the city.
While damages is a predicate of possession, it is not determinative; the issue of damages
is a separate and unique analysis the must be established beyond possession. Damage is
the real issue in this case.
Much like in State v. Brown. 2009 UT App 281, 221 P.3d 273, in which this Court
held that the victim's relocation expenses were not proper restitution, the prosecution
never established any economic harm to Stewart. Furthermore, the Sitate's argument that
Stewart's labor is a proper basis for restitution seems to avert the fact that Stewart was
folly compensated for his work by his employer. (R. 78: 20) (Stewart testified that he
was folly compensated despite Defendant's conduct).

3

In support of its position, the State cites State v. Horner, 770 P.2d 1056 (Wash
App. 1989) and People v. Hamblin, 568 N.W.2d 339 (Mich. App. 1997). While
Defendant does not refute the persuasive nature of these cases - in that a criminal
defendant is responsible for actual damage/loss to a victim - they are inapplicable here.
Ostensibly, the State's reliance on Horner and Hamblin is to circumvent the
requirement that the victim incur actual economic harm. In Horner, the Washington
appellate court determined that the uncontroverted evidence that the victim's labor in
repairing a window damaged by a juvenile was not speculative was proper restitution.
Horner, 770 P.2d 1056, 807-09. In Hamblin, the Michigan appellate court, relying on
Homer, justified the trial court's use of testimony regarding the price to replace a broken
window ($45) and estimated labor costs in assessing total restitution. Hamblin, 568
N.W.2d 339, 345-46.
Conversely, however, while the victims in Homer and Hamblin used their own
efforts to replace/repair personal property and thus were not compensated for the extra
efforts, Stewart did not suffer any economic herm. Both the victims in Homer and
Hamblin chose to pay for repairs out of their own pockets in addition to choosing to
repair their personal items by their own labor. Here, no evidence was given to show that
Stewart lost pay or suffered some other economic harm.1

1

Speculatively, the State argues that "Stewart could have spent this time [time to recover
the data] in other activities, including, had he chosen, other activities that generated
income." Appellee Br. at 12. The trial court made no such findings and is purely
speculative and thus irrelevant.
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Although Stewart testified that he spent time recreating the documents, again, he
also testified that he suffered no economic harm. Stewart testified that he spent and
additional 30 hours on top of his 30-40 hour work-week recreating these files. (R.
78:19). However, that time was voluntarily spent reconstructing work-related items and
it was for work that he was compensated for. As Defendant argued in his brief, if the
circumstances were different and Stewart's employment was affected such that he could
show actual economic loss instead of speculating that he could have earned money doing
other activities, the analysis would be different. See, Appellant Br. at 12-13; Appellee
Br. at 11-12.
Basically, if this Court is to uphold the trial court's restitution order Stewart, who
continued to earn his standard salary through UVU of $64,000, would gain an additional
$9,758 income.2 This windfall is inappropriate because Stewart did not suffer pecuniary
harm and does not serve the purposes of restitution. See, State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53,
% 18,214 P.3d 104, 109 (affirming that restitution has a two-fold purpose: compensate
the victim for pecuniary damages and for deterrence and rehabilitation as determined by
the court based on society's competing needs.).
EL

THE MODIFIED "BUT FOR" ANALYSIS APPLIES ONLY TO
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY ADMITTED TO BY DEFENDANT WHICH
RESULTED IN PECUNIARY HARM
Defendant agrees with the State that "A court may order restitution only if the

defendant has been convicted of a crime that resulted in pecuniary damages and agrees to
pay restitution or admits to the criminal conduct." State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, %
2

Total restitution ordered was $9,838, $80 of which was to UVU for employing Simply Mac to retrieve documents.
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3, 987 P.2d 1289 (emphasis in original); see also, Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(b) and (c).
This principle was also codified: "When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that
has resulted in pecuniary damages..., the court shall order that the defendant make
restitution to victims of crime... or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to
make restitution as part of a plea disposition." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l). The
State seems to claim that Defendant need not have allocated to the damage of files on the
computer, only that there be a "but for" connection between the theft and the resulting
damage. The "but for" test, is applicable, however, only once "pecuniary" harm is
established.
a. Because Stewart Suffered No Pecuniary Harm, the Modified "But For"
Test is Inapplicable
Defendant asserts that because Stewart did not suffer pecuniary (economic) harm,
any "but for" analysis is moot. In State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah Ct App.
1997), this Court addressed whether the "'intervening and superseding negligence of the
police in failing to contact the car's owners' relieves [defendant] of any liability for any
loss resulting from the sale of the impounded Camaro." In McBride, the defendant pled
guilty to a lesser charge of joyriding and, following a restitution hearing, was ordered to
pay the victim $600 - the value of the vehicle. Id. at 541-42. At issue in McBride was
the applicability of any intervening or superseding negligence by the police department
that was the actual result of the vehicle being sold without the victim's consent or
knowledge. What was not in dispute in McBride, which clearly distinguishes itself from
these facts, was whether the victim suffered pecuniary harm.
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Here, and unlike the victim in McBride, Stewart did not suffer pecuniary harm.
As stated, restitution may only be ordered if the victim suffered pecuniary damages. See,
State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, \ 3; Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-302(l 1) ("Restitution"
means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim....). Thus, a
determination of pecuniary damage serves as the gatekeeper for any "but for" analysis.
Because no harm befell Stewart, restitution is inappropriate. Of, McBride, 940 P.2d 539
(victim's personal vehicle was sold without his knowledge or consent and thus suffered a
$600 economic harm because he was unable to sell it on his own); State v. Watson, 1999
UT App 273 (pecuniary damages were established because the victim's family required
counseling).
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the trial court committed error in its interpretation and ultimate
application of the law, in that no pecuniary damage occurred Defendant respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's restitution order of $9,838.00.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of October, 2010.

(^v^
lichael». Brown
Counsel for Appellant
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